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Toward a Better Understanding of

New Value
S.W. O'Donnell*
I.

Introduction

The recent popping of the dot.com equity bubble has resulted in a
flood of new bankruptcy filings.' Though every level of business has
been affected by the contraction of investment, none was more
susceptible than the small start-up business. 2 Often relying upon a good
idea, a handful of coffee-drinking twenty-somethings, and the largesse of
big business, these companies quickly found themselves in debt. Thus,
as bankruptcy calls, those once happy investors are now looking to
With sufficient business acumen and
salvage their investment.
choice would be to reinvest or otherwise
natural
the
substantial capital,
3
acquire the bankruptcy estate. Standing in the way of an otherwise
* J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Law Clerk to the Honorable Harry Lee
Hudspeth, United States District Court, Western District of Texas. The author wishes to
thank Cynthia Finley, Jimmy Rodriguez, Robert Rouder, Louis Campbell, and Derek
Talerico for their assistance in the writing of this Article. Finally, this Article is
dedicated to the loving memory of Sarah, a most faithful beagle
I have heard a red beagle's cry
on the sloop beside the stream:
it has raised the waves of my head,
the sweet-voiced beagle's bay.
A Beagle's Cry.
1. Michael Liedtke, Dot-corn Death Toll Doubles in 2001, ASSOCIATED PRESS
STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Dec. 28, 2001 (Bankruptcies among internet companies reached a

record high of 537 in 2001, compared with 225 in 2000).
2. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Speech at the FederalReserve Bank of Kansas City's
2002 Economic Policy Symposium, ECON. REV., Oct. 1, 2002, at 5 ("In light of the
burgeoning supply, the pace of increased demand for the newer technologies, though
rapid, fell short of that needed to sustain the elevated real rate of return for the whole of
the high-tech capital stock. Returns on the securities of high-tech firms ultimately
collapsed, as did capital investment."); see also What's Goodfor Investors May Not Be
Goodfor the US, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 2002, at 12 ("the collapse in some
parts of the tech industry has been so severe that it threatens to undermine traditional
centres of technological excellence").
3. See, e.g., Jim Jungjohann, Component Darwinism: Surviving the Shakeout
"Survival of the Fittest" Will Ultimately Work in Our Industry's Favor,LIGHTWAVE, Oct.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:3

economically sensible decision is the absolute priority rule.4
Traditionally, the absolute priority rule has been the bane of singleasset real estate enterprises rather than that of idle technology capital. 5
This coincidental state of affairs can be blamed on a previous investment
bubble, the railroads.6 Unlike busted bubbles of the past, the remaining
equity in an internet firm may be as conceptual as an underutilized patent
or as ephemeral as a consumer database. Regardless, the challenge to the
courts and to investors is how to salvage equity from these bankrupt
firms in a manner consistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978. 7
This Article examines the new value exception to the absolute
priority rule and argues that it has vitality under the Bankruptcy Code.
However, the form in which the new value exception exists is
fundamentally different from previous bankruptcy regimes. Under the
superceded bankruptcy regime, the new value exception existed as an
exception to the rigorous requirements of the common law absolute
priority rule. With the codification of that rule under the Bankruptcy
Code, the Supreme Court recognized that the new value exception arises
from the qualifying language of the statute. Though the Court's decision
in Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership8 is equivocal, the proper approach to the new value

2002, at 69 ("The venture capitalist would rather take the chance of merging the startup
with another company with product traction and no cash or take the pre-bubble attitude of
building a company over five years.").
4. Colloquially, the absolute priority rule prohibits the equity holders in the failed
enterprise from participating in the reorganized entity. The Bankruptcy Code states the
absolute priority rule this way: "the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002).
5. Part of the reason why single-asset real estate enterprises are so prevalent in new
value case law is that, as bankruptcy estates, these enterprises are quite amenable to new
value plans. Megan Hamilton, The Absolute Priority Rule and New Value: Before and
After Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership, 105 COM. L.J. 331, 347 (2000) (citing Judith Miller & John Murray,
The "New Value" Exception: Myth or Reality After Bank of America National Trust &
Savings v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership?, 104 COM. L.J. 147, 160 (1999)).
6. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
7. Reorganization of corporate entities has both an efficiency and a distributional
purpose. With respect to efficiency, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to maximize the size of
the bankruptcy estate so that any distribution is Pareto superior. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(7);
see infra note 13 1. The distributional aspect of the Bankruptcy Code is the preservation
of jobs and the protection of investors by "permitting business debtors to reorganize and
restructure their debts in order to revive the debtors' businesses ....
Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991). For an excellent discussion of the tension between these two
goals see Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987).
8. 526 U.S. 434 (1999). This case represents the seminal, if confused, word on the
new value exception by the Supreme Court.
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9
exception is as a causation threshold test for the absolute priority rule.
There are, theoretically, three ways to read the Supreme Court's
opinion in North LaSalle. The first is that the Supreme Court articulated
a new value corollary different from that which existed previously. In
other words, the new value corollary would be satisfied by testing the
market value of the retained equity interest. The second potential
reading is that the plan in North LaSalle was so egregious as to violate
any possible understanding of "on account of." The better reading,
advocated by this Article, is that the Supreme Court found a violation of
the "on account of' language, thus not requiring consideration of the new
value corollary itself. In other words, the Court's ruling implies that the
test it proposes in North LaSalle is separate from any new value
corollary. This is supported by the concurrence's observation that the
majority's discussion of the new value corollary is dictum that is
10
"binding neither [on] this Court nor the lower federal courts."
The importance of this approach, cannot be understated. First, it is
the best way to reconcile the Supreme, Court's previous holding in
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers.1 The Supreme Court, as well as
lower courts, have specifically limited the form in which new value may
be contributed. These limitations have no relationship to whether old
equity's participation is in violation of the absolute priority rule. Second,
the five-factor test for new value is best viewed as a prudential hurdle
reflecting the courts' concern about the abuses of the bankruptcy system.
In other words, the five-factor test raises the baseline standard created by
Congress in the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, the triumph of a causation
test based upon statutory language is recognition that those arguments
supporting a prudential new value test have failed.
Therefore, this Article argues that the proper formulation of the new
value exception is two-part. First, the debtor must satisfy the Bankruptcy
Code's requirement that old equity does not participate on account of its
previous stake. Though the test for this level of causation is unclear, the
Supreme Court's decision in North LaSalle provides a starting point. If
the debtor can satisfy the causation test of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii),
the debtor must then overcome the courts' suspicion of the Bankruptcy
Code as a mechanism for depriving junior creditors of certain rights in
equity. To do this, the debtor must show that the contribution satisfies

9. Put differently, where old equity's participation in the reorganized entity is
caused by its prior stake in the company, the absolute priority rule is invoked.
joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
10. North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J.,
11. 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (while refusing to rule on the vitality of the new value

exception, the Court held that the contribution of "sweat equity" cannot be considered of
money or money's worth).
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the five-part new value test developed by case law. 12
II.

Historical Developments of the Absolute Priority Rule

Many scholars of the new value exception spend an inordinate
amount of time on the historical development of the absolute priority rule
and its attendant exception. 13 This, however, misses the point entirely.
The more important distinction is between the historical and legal
context in which both operated. Any examination of the vitality of the
new value exception is incomplete without fully considering the
application of the absolute priority rule within different bankruptcy
regimes. Still, for completeness' sake, the history of the new value
exception is worth a brief mention.
A.

Absolute Priority
1. Common Law and the Bankruptcy Act

The common law rule of absolute priority was developed by the
federal judiciary in response to abuses in railroad receivership actions. 14
Unscrupulous railroad managers would collude with senior creditors to
wipe out debt to junior creditors, while maintaining equity in the hands
of pre-petition shareholders. 15 Such reorganization plans, however,
could not be "fair and equitable" as required by common law or the
various bankruptcy laws enacted prior to 1978.16 Thus was formulated
12. See infra note 25.
13. As legal academics are wont to do, too much ink has been spilt on the historical
development of the new value exception. Fortunately, those readers looking for a more
in depth recounting of the new value exception need not look far. For those inclined
towards the academic recounting of its development, the following articles should be
consulted. See Randolph J. Haines, The UnwarrantedAttack on New Value, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 387 (1998); Alexander F. Watson, Note, Left for Dead?: The Supreme
Court's Treatment of the New Value Exception in Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1190
(2000). For those who prefer the recitation of historical facts in case law, the judiciary
has been equally prodigious in its narrative of the exception. See Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1362 (7th Cir. 1990); BT/SAP Pool
C Associates v. Coltex Loop Central Three Partners, 203 B.R. 527, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996).
14. See David R. Perlmutter, Navigating a Proposed "New Value" Plan Through the
Cross-Currents of the Confirmation Process: An Arduous Journey for the Debtor of a
Single-Asset Real Estate Case, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 427, 430 (1996) (citations omitted).
15. See id.
16. The development of the absolute priority rule and the new value exception is
long and sordid, with various courts attempting to justify these doctrines under various
legal regimes. Whatever the common law justification of the absolute priority rule, the
use of the undefined term "fair and equitable" became the crux of the rule. The
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the common law rule of absolute priority: creditors must be paid in full
before pre-petition equity holders could retain any interest in the postpetition entity. 7
Realizing the harshness of the absolute priority rule, the Court
began to consider circumstances where pre-petition equity holders could
retain a proprietary interest in the debtor.18 In dicta, the courts held that
pre-petition equity holders could retain a stake in a reorganized entity
where their retained interest was commensurate with their capital
contribution and such contribution could not be obtained through any
other source.' 9 So rigorous were the requirements of the new value
20
exception that there is no reported decision upholding a new value plan.
This fact was further exacerbated by the arduous standards required to
confirm a plan. In order for a court to confirm a pre-Bankruptcy Code
plan of reorganization, each class of impaired debtors must have
consented and the plan's treatment of dissenting impaired creditors must
be "fair and equitable." Put differently, an implicit condition on the new
value exception was that all classes of creditors consent to the transfer of
The exceptionally onerous
equity to pre-petition equity holders.
constraints on the application of the new value exception may explain
a plan that gave
why no court "rel[ied] on the Case dictum to approve
21
reorganization."
after
right
property
a
old equity
2. Absolute Priority Under the Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 represents a marked departure from
the previous regime. First, a senior creditor may voluntarily waive rights
under the absolute priority rule by allowing junior creditors some

Bankruptcy Code of 1978 represents the first attempt by Congress to provide a statutory
definition of "fair and equitable." See Julie L. Friedberg, Comment, Wanted Dead or
Alive: The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 893,
908-09 (1993).
17. See Michael H. Strub, Jr., Competition, Bargaining,and Exclusivity Under the
New Value Rule: Applying the Single Asset Paradigmof Bonner Mail, 111 BANKING L.J.
228, 238 (citing Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 414 (1868);
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C.R. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899)).
18. See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913).
19. Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939) (citing Kansas
City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co, 271 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1926)).
20. Jarlon Tsang, Note, The New Value Exception: Valuation Obstacles to the
Absolute Priority Rule, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 361, 368 (1995) (citing Bruce A.
Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44
STAN. L. REV. 69, 92 (1991)).
21. Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
445-46 (1999) (citing John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 963, 1016 (1989)).
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recovery. 22 Second, the proponent of a plan may use the cram-down
mechanism to obtain confirmation so long as one class of impaired
creditors has acceded to the plan.2 3 A court may either accept or reject
the plan depending on whether it does not discriminate against dissenting
creditors and whether it meets the statutory requirements of "fair and
equitable" under § 1129(b)(2). 24 Thus, the absolute priority rule is
limited to a situation where the reorganization plan is being forced upon
unsecured creditors who have dissented from the plan of
25
reorganization.
B.

New Value Exception

Prior to the Bankruptcy Code regime, the new value exception
required pre-petition equity holders to contribute capital that was (1)
money or money's worth of (2) substantial (3) new value (4)
commensurate with the post-petition equity stake and (5) necessary to
such reorganization.2 6 The burden was upon the proponents of the
reorganization plan to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
confirmation plan satisfied the requirements of the new value
exception.27 Failure to satisfy the elements of this new value test
prevented a plan from 8being confirmed, even with the consent of the
2
entire class of creditors.
1.

Money or Money's Worth

While the Supreme Court has been equivocal as to the existence of
the new value exception, it has been unequivocal with respect to the first
element. Something is of money's worth when it has tangible value
ascertained through market participation; 29 something is not of money's

22. In re Winters, 99 B.R. 658, 662 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) ("[tlhe important
difference [between the old absolute priority rule and the Bankruptcy Code] is that the
[Bankruptcy Code] permits senior classes to take less than full payment in order to
expedite or insure the success of the reorganization").
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(10) (2002).
24. Id. § 1129(b)(1).

25.

Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).

26. See, e.g., In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Case
v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939); In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126,
1131 (7th Cir. 1992)); BT/SAP Pool C Associates v. Coltex Loop Central Three Partners,
203 B.R. 527, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
27. In re Briscoe Enterprises, 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993) (issues of fairness
under the Bankruptcy Code must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).
28. Watson, supra note 13, at 1214 (citing Northern Pac, R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S.
482, 506 (1913)).
29. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).

2004]

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

worth if it is "intangible, inalienable, and . . . unenforceable. ' 3 °

As

applied, this definition has proven far less flexible than a mere "market
test" might suggest. 31 Courts have explicitly rejected such assets as
"sweat equity" 32 and loan guarantees. 33 Thus, the "money or money's
worth" points toward two requirements of equity contributions: 34 easily
quantifiable by a court and fungible enough to transcend the needs of the
reorganized entity.35
2.

New and Substantial

Not only must the contribution of the pre-petition equity holders be
of money or money's worth, it must also be new and substantial. A
capital contribution is "new" when it is made up front.3 6 Substantiality,
on the other hand, is a relative term that turns on the facts of the case at
hand.37 The courts have generally measured substantiality by comparing
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., id. at 197 ("future services cannot be exchanged in any market for
something of value to the creditors today"); Case, 308 U.S. at 113 ("'financial standing
and influence in the community' and... 'continuity of management' constitute no legal
justification for the issuance of new stock..."); In re Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc., 72 B.R.
454, 457 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1987) ("borrowing by a reorganized debtor cannot be
considered a capital contribution by its shareholders").
32. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 197.
33. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1362
(7th Cir. 1990).
34. The lower court in Ahlers was willing to find that labor and managerial
experience were "money or money's worth" due to the fact such contributions had value
and were measurable. Two of the justifications for the Supreme Court's rejection of such
a position ring hollow. The first is that labor and managerial experience "reflect merely
vague hopes or possibilities." Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 204 (quoting Case, 308 U.S. at 12223). Such a position is simply not tenable given that the courts, in other areas of the law,
consistently put value to such things. Second, the Court found it dispositive that
Congress did not accept the Bankruptcy Commission's invitation to allow new value
based on labor contributions. One is immediately struck by the irony of the Court using
this basis to make a ruling on a part of the new value exception and simultaneously
refusing to use it to definitively decide the question of the exception's continued
existence.
35. Arguably the reason for the second requirement is that, in the case of a second
failure of the entity, there will be some measure of recompense for the hold-over
creditors. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualizationof the Absolute
Priority Rule and its New Value Exception, 1993 DET. C. L. REV. 1445, 1473 (1993)
("These cases indicate that any new value must be an up front infusion of money or
money's worth, with a capacity to be sold to raise money or satisfy a debt, and must have
a place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new entity. Courts 'will not accept
assets of indeterminate or uncertain value or assets that have significant limitations on
their alienability."') (citations omitted).
36. See In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Pecht, 57 B.R.
137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
37. Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
450 (1999); see also In re Olson, 80 B.R. 935, 937 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (citation
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the capital contribution of pre-petition equity holders with the amount of
unsecured debt due or discharged.3 8 As with most factual inquiries, the
conclusions of the lower courts are arrayed between extremes.3 9
3.

Reasonable Equivalence

The fourth condition of the new value exception is that the equity
interest taken by pre-petition equity holders be reasonably equivalent to
the contribution made. In other words, "old equity must be offering a
fair price for the equitable ownership of the post-reorganization
business. 40 This reflects the underlying policy of the new value
exception, namely, that creditors' full rights of priority in the estate's
assets are preserved. 4'
Effectively, the requirement of reasonable
equivalence requires the bankruptcy court to make a valuation
determination with respect to the estate's assets. The Supreme Court
has, in earlier cases, emphasized the "capitalization of prospective
earnings" method.4 2 Recently, the North LaSalle Court suggested that
the measure of one's contribution ought to be done through the market
(i.e., not only must it be substantial, but one's post-petition equity stake
must be such that it reflects the market value of that contribution).43 The
omitted).
38. In re Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. P'ship, 115 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1997); In re
Woodbrook Associates, 19 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Olson, 80 B.R. at 937.
39. Some courts have been willing to find investments of less than 4% to be
substantial while others have found that same amount lacking. See In re Elmwood, Inc.,
182 B.R. 845 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1995); see also In re SLC Ltd. V, 138 B.R. 847 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1992) (a bankruptcy court could reasonably find that $62,000 was a substantial
infusion of capital); contrast In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 710
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (an investment of 3.6% of unsecured debt was not substantial
enough) (citing In re Pullman Construction Industries, Inc., 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D.
I11.
1989) (contribution of 2% to 4% not substantial)); In re Ashton, 63 B.R. 244 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1986) (4.3% ratio unsubstantial)).
40. Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9
(1991).
41. The bankruptcy court in Greystone described the underlying policy of the
reasonable equivalency test as follows:
[T]he participation or consideration accorded to those making the capital
infusion must be commensurate with or reasonably equivalent to the capital
infusion, to discourage current owners from buying up the venture for a
relatively modest investment and to preserve the absolute priority rule.
In re Greystone III
Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 577 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
42. Id.at 579 (citing Consolidated Rock Products, Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 526
(1941)).
43. "In the interest of statutory coherence, a like disfavor for decisions untested by
competitive choice ought to extend to valuations in administering subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii)
when some form of market valuation may be available to test the adequacy of an old
equity holder's proposed contribution." Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1999).

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

2004]

advantage of this approach is that it accounts for many of the variables
that other, more heuristic methods must leave to theory. 4
However, a market approach may not always be feasible or achieve
the intended result. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the market
approach is predicated upon the existence of a market for a reorganized
entity whose only value is as a "going concern., 45 Second, the Court's
46
position expresses a concern vis d vis the potential "insider" knowledge
possessed by old equity. 47

Thus, as the Court sees it, the market

approach will bring out the true value of the enterprise. Of course, such
a conclusion is based upon a passing familiarity with economics and
expresses more of a hope than a rule.48 Whatever measure the courts
apply, they must bear in mind that there is an underlying preference in
the Bankruptcy Code to avoid vesting broad discretion in the bankruptcy
49

court.

4.

Necessity

Finally, the new value exception is applicable only when the capital
contribution of pre-petition equity holders is necessary for the continued
viability of the reorganized entity. According to Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., the offending investment must be "essential to the
success of the [reorganized entity]. 50 The requirement of necessity
should be strictly construed: "[I]f a cash infusion is not necessary to the
reorganization effort, the debtor will have failed to have raised the
44. To this end many scholars have argued that the exclusivity period granted to a
debtor in order to formulate a plan of reorganization violates the absolute priority rule.
Such an argument has a great deal of appeal in that it places the debtor's proposed plan
against possible, feasible, alternatives. However, any argument in favor of abandoning
the exclusivity period is pure conjecture given that exclusivity is provided for in the
Bankruptcy Code. I I U.S.C. §§ 1121(b)-(c) (2002).
45. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207-09 (1988).
46. "Insider" knowledge is used loosely to refer to the information that might come
to one based upon regular interaction with an entity.
47. The concern is that old equity will be in a better position to know the true value
of the reorganized entity and seek to avoid testing that knowledge in the market. Of
course, this is premised on the Court's assumption that somehow the market will
ultimately be possessed of this same special knowledge that courts were unable to divine.
48. Suppose that the true value, to old equity, of the new enterprise is SX. Also
suppose that this figure reflects considerations of risk. This means that old equity is
willing to pay anything up to, but not including, SX (at $X old equity is indifferent
between the investment). If this enterprise were put to an auction, the opportunity cost to
the winning bidder would be the second highest bid. In other words, old equity would
only be paying the highest price that other parties are willing to pay. This does not
capture old equity's real valuation of the enterprise.
49. Cf In re LaPiana, 100 B.R. 998, 1001-02 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1989)
50. 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939) (citing Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central
Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926)).
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predicate equitable concern that motivated resort to the exceptions."5 1
Practically, the measure of necessity has been the effect of the capital
contribution on the feasibility of the reorganization plan. 52 The standard
seems to be that a contribution is necessary if, but for the contribution,
the reorganization would fail. 53
III. New Value Under the Bankruptcy Code
While Congress codified the absolute priority rule, it apparently did
not do the same for the new value exception. The result is confusion
among the judiciary as to the continued vitality of the new value
exception and its proper exercise. Some courts relied upon the plain
meaning of the statute to find that Congress expressly or impliedly
allowed for an "exception" to the absolute priority rule. 54 Others relied
upon the same canon of statutory interpretation to hold that the new
value exception does not exist. 55 Still more courts argued that
Congress's failure to clearly repudiate the new value exception indicated
Congress's intent to retain it. 56 This same reasoning was also used by
opponents of the new value exception to conclude that Congress
repudiated any exception. 7 Finally, other courts relied upon the statute's
explicit definition of5 8"fair and equitable" to declare the demise of the
new value exception.
Rather than settle the issue with its first new value exception case
under the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court only created further
confusion. In holding that future contributions of labor did not qualify as
51. In re Mortgage Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 619 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)
52. It has been argued that there are two possible interpretations of the "necessity"
requirement. Adams, supra note 35, at 1472-73. The first holds that the contribution is
necessary where no one else will make a contribution. See, e.g., In re Marston Enter., 13
B.R. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). The other position holds that, not only must old equity
be the only contributor, but also that the enterprise would fail but for that contribution.
See, e.g., In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
53. See Adams, supra note 35, at 1473.
54. Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
447 (1999); BT/SAP Pool C Associates v. Coltex Loop Central Three Partners, 203 B.R.
527, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("the new value exception survived [implicitly] when
[Congress] enacted the Code").
55. In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (in
defining "fair and equitable" Congress created minimum standards for confirmation); In
re Winters, 99 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (with apparent deliberation,
Congress fundamentally changed the absolute priority rule).
56. North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 447; In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 912-13
(9th Cir. 1993); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 127 B.R. 138, 142 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990).
57. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1991).
58. In re Outlook/Century, 127 B.R. at 656 (in defining "fair and equitable"
Congress created minimum standards for confirmation); In re Winters, 99 B.R. at 663
(with apparent deliberation, Congress fundamentally changed the absolute priority rule).
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"money or money's worth," the Court unequivocally stated that "our
decision .. . should not be taken as any comment on the continuing

vitality of the [new value exception]-a question which has divided the
lower courts since passage of the Code in 1978." 59 The irony of this
position is rich: the Court is willing to hold that certain contributions do
not meet the requirements of the new value exception and yet refuse to
hold on that exception's vitality. But this observation aside, Ahlers
further exacerbated the confusion in lower courts as many took it as
disapproval of the new value exception.6 °
A.

The Greystone Debacle
1.

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Texas

Perhaps the most remarkable example of the confusion created by
Congress's "failure" to codify the new value exception is In re Greystone
III Joint Venture.6 1 This case began like many new value cases do:
Greystone incurred substantial debt to finance the purchase of an office
building. At the time of bankruptcy Greystone owed its various creditors
nearly $10,000,000.62

Chief among these creditors was Phoenix Mutual

Life Insurance Corp., which had loaned Greystone $8,800,000 on a nonrecourse promissory note secured by a first lien.63 At bankruptcy, this
debt was valued at $5,825,000, leaving an unsecured amount of
approximately $3,500,000.64
The Second Amended Plan of
59. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 n.3 (1988). Though the
Court failed to settle the issue of the existence of the new value exception, it cannot be
accused of failing to identify the problem. Of course, a cynic might find amusement in
the Court's observation of division in the lower courts given that recently its major
function has become referee to such divides.
60. Anthony L. Miscioscia, Jr., Note, The Bankruptcy Code and the New Value
Doctrine: An Examination of History, Illusions, and the Need for Competitive Bidding,
79 VA. L. REv. 917, 924 (1993).
61. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1274. It was Justice Breyer's opinion that the
confusion surrounding the new value exception was due to Congress's failure to
explicitly disavow the doctrine. "Enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in place of the prior
Act might have resolved the status of new value by a provision bearing its name or at
least unmistakably couched in its terms, but the Congress chose not to avail itself of that
opportunity." North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 446. Just like the Court's practice of
disapproving new value plans while claiming not to be ruling on the existence of the new
value exception, this statement represents the Supreme Court's practice of walking the
fine line between issuing an order and writing an opinion.
62. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1276-77.
63. Id.
64. The Bankruptcy Code provides for the splitting of classification of debt in the
event that the appraised value of an asset is less than the amount of debt owed. For that
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Reorganization proposed that unsecured creditors, such as Phoenix and
trade creditors, receive four cents on the dollar for their claims while all
but Phoenix would receive the remainder of these claims from the
general partner. 65 Though Phoenix voted to reject the plan, the other
trade creditors and the class of holders of tenant security deposits voted
to accept it. 66 Further, Phoenix's proffered plan was rejected by the
bankruptcy court. 67
Phoenix challenged the confirmation on several grounds, including
on the grounds of the new value exception. 68 In holding that the new
value exception had continued vitality under the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy court reasoned that the new value exception was nothing
more than an extension of the absolute priority rule 69 and was therefore
Such a position,
impliedly adopted by Congress in § 1129(b)(2).
of the absolute
codification
Congress's
into
much
too
reads
however,
priority rule. Under the superceded bankruptcy regime, the absolute
priority rule arose from the courts' concern that reorganization plans be
"fair and equitable., 70 And while Congress did enact an absolute priority
rule, it "[did] not codify any authoritative pre-Code version of the
absolute priority rule." 71 As such, it is difficult to see how Congress, in
creating a new version of the absolute priority rule, intended to cling to it
old meanings.

part of the debt above the appraised value, the creditor becomes an unsecured creditor.
11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b) (2002). As such, one creditor may be a member of multiple classes
of creditors even where the debt is secured by a single asset.
65. In return for this intervention the general partner would receive 100% of the
post-petition entity. This was removed from the plan as confirmed by the bankruptcy
court.
66. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1278. The panel's opinion held that the debtor's
classification of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 1122 was improper. Therefore, the plan did
not have the unanimous vote of one class of impaired creditors as required by § 1129(b).
67. Id. at 1277.
68. The creditor's challenge to the confirmation of the plan was threefold: that the
debtor made an improper distinction between unsecured debt and trade debt, that tenants
were improperly considered impaired creditors, and that the new value exception did not
exist under the Bankruptcy Code. The first two proved sufficient to defeat the debtor's
plan.
69. "The Case 'exception' is still good law, as it represents nothing more than an
extension of the fair and equitable concept to embrace the need for new capital for the
venture. To the extent the 'fair and equitable' concept has been brought forward into the
Code, therefore, so also has the expansion on that concept enunciated in Case." In re
Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 574 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
70. 11 U.S.C. (repealed) § 621(2) (1976).
71. Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
448 (1999).
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United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

On appeal, the district court took a different approach in upholding
the new value plan. Rather than find that the new value exception was
implied in the absolute priority rule, the District Court held that neither
the Bankruptcy Code nor the Supreme Court had explicitly rejected the
new value exception.72
Instead, the new value exception was
incorporated via the requirements of fairness and equity. 73 The District
Court found support for this position in the reasoning that the equitable
concerns motivating the original new value exception had not been
diminished under the Bankruptcy Code.74 The District Court argued that
"the rule is a logical extension of the notion that an equity reorganization
' 75
should, in all respects, be 'fair and equitable."'
There are two reasons why such a position stands inapposite to the
statute. First, the Bankruptcy Code specifically defines the term "fair
and equitable" 76 and sets out what a plan must do in order to be "fair and
equitable" to those on whom the plan is being forced.77 A major
component of this requirement is that the plan satisfy the absolute
priority rule of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).78 Second, the equitable powers of
the courts presiding over a bankruptcy estate are limited to the
boundaries of the Bankruptcy Code. 79 Thus, the definition of "fair and
equitable" simply does not leave room for the courts to hollow out a new
80
value exception.
72. In re Greystone, 127 B.R. at 142.
73. Id. at 138. There is a nuanced distinction separating the reasoning of the two
courts. The Bankruptcy Court found that the new value exception was implied in the
absolute priority rule, which itself was a creature of the "fair and equitable" requirements
of the previous law. However, the District Court's reasoning is a bit more tenuous in that
the Code defines what is fair and equitable without including the new value exception.
Arguably, the Bankruptcy Court's position is the logical conclusion of the District
Court's position, but this does seem to put too fine a point on it.
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id.
76. As opposed to the Bankruptcy Act, which defines "fair and equitable" in broad
terms allowing a great deal of flexibility in the judicial process. Thus, according to
Justice Douglas in Case, the courts could find justification for the new value exception
after the enactment of the Act. Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114-17
(1939).
77. "Congress not only used the possible words of art 'fair and equitable' but went
on in § 1129(b)(2) to specify certain minimum requirements established by the phrase
and defined a new version of the absolute priority rule for unsecured creditors in
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)." In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
78. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002).
79. "[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
80. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 35, at 1460 (citing James J. White, Absolute
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the
First Time

Greystone's new value plan foundered on the sharp quill of Judge
Edith Jones. Writing for a unanimous three judge panel of the Fifth
Circuit, Judge Jones was unpersuaded by the arguments of either the
debtor or the lower courts. 8' The opinion sliced through the various
arguments advanced in favor of the new value exception and concluded
that the new value exception did not survive the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code.8 2 The judgment of the court rested primarily on three
propositions: the present Bankruptcy Code regime was inapplicable to
the circumstances under which the new value exception had previously
been employed; the language of the Bankruptcy Code repudiated the new
value exception; and the statutory language did not include room for any
exception to the absolute priority rule.8 3
Contextually, the court argued that the new value exception has
little meaning in the Bankruptcy Code era.84 At the time of Case, a "fair
and equitable" plan could only be confirmed with the unanimous support
of every class of creditors. 85 Further, a plan that failed the requirements
of "fair and equitable" could not be confirmed even with the unanimous
consent of every class of creditors.8 6 Therefore, the opportunity for old
equity to participate in the reorganized entity was limited to very narrow
situations where each class of creditors agreed to the plan and the
elements of the new value exception were met.
The Bankruptcy Code dramatically changed this system. Now, a
plan may be confirmed so long as it meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a). A class votes for confirmation where "two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims" vote for
confirmation.87 Thus, to obtain a favorable vote, the debtor must secure
Priority and New Value, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1991)) ("as pointed out by Professor
White, having taken one large step beyond a mere statement of the fair and equitable rule
by its statement of section 1129(b)(2), Congress could have gone, but clearly did not go
to the next small step and spell out the new value exception.").
81. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1276 (5th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. Or, as Judge Jones put it, with regard to arguments in favor of the new value
exception, "There is no there there." Id. at 1282 (paraphrasing Gertrude Stein).
83. Id. at 1282.
84. Id at 1283-84.
85. Citing the decision of the Seventh Circuit in North LaSalle, the Supreme Court
characterized the new value exception as allowing the participation of junior equity in
reorganization over the objection of a senior class of creditors. This understanding of the
new value exception is incorrect insofar as it describes the exception at the time of Case.
86. Id. at 1282.
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8) (2002). The Bankruptcy Code gives the court
power to disallow a creditor's vote that is not made in bad faith. Id. § 1126(e).
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not only the vote of the largest creditor in the class, but a majority of the
members of that class.8 8 Where the classes of impaired creditors approve
the plan, it may be confirmed without meeting the requirements of "fair
and equitable., 89 In other words, a properly confirmed plan may now
completely avoid the requirements of the absolute priority rule. 90 In the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit's original panel opinion, this was the
congressionally-created vehicle for old equity's participation, not a preCode common law exception. 9' The debtor's appeal to the possible
inclusive language of the requirement of "fair and equitable" was also a
failure.92 Previous statutory language only required that every plan must
be fair and equitable.9 3 As mentioned previously, the absolute priority
rule (and, therefore, the new value exception) derived from the courts'
interpretation of this rather general phrase. However, Congress's use of
the term "fair and equitable" in the Bankruptcy Code corresponds with
an explicit statutory definition. As Judge Jones noted, the statutory
language of § 1129(b)(2) creates a minimum standard that cannot be
impliedly excepted.94
The debtor's argument that Congress's failure to repudiate the new
value exception was equally deficient. 95 Prior to the adoption of the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress instructed the Bankruptcy Commission to
create proposals for the new law.96 Chief among the recommendations
of the Commission was that the new value exception be enacted along
with the absolute priority rule.9 7 However, during deliberations, neither
house of Congress ever passed a version of § 1129 that included a new
value exception.9 8 Thus, under the principle that "Congress does not
88. At first glance this seems to be an improvement over the previous system, which
required acceptance by all creditors. However, mustering one-half of the creditors in
every class, with the added requirement of a super majority of each class's debt, is still
daunting. On the other hand, unlike the superceded bankruptcy regime, confirmation of a
plan cannot be obstructed by intransigent dissenting creditors.
89. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
90. A plan need only be "fair and equitable" where at least one class of impaired
creditors has voted to confirm. The absolute priority rule is thus invoked only where the
debtor seeks to use this method of confirmation to cram down a plan on dissenting
creditors. See id.
91. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1277.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
93. See supra text accompanying note 16.
94. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1283.
95. This position is echoed by Justice Breyer in the North LaSalle decision. See
supra note 61.
96. Bankruptcy Study Comm'n, PuB. L. No. 91-354, 84 STAT. 468 (1970).
97. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 254-259 (1973); see also In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at
1283 (citing Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1974)).

98. Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
446-47 (1999).
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intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier
discarded," such an argument must fail. 99
4.

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the
Second Time

After ruling that the new value exception did not survive the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the same panel chose to withdraw
that part of the opinion. 00 The court made it clear that it had expressed
no opinion on the issue of the new value exception. In what became her
dissent, Judge Jones believed that the court's change of heart was due, in
0
part, to the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm.'
Regardless, the capricious nature of Greystone can only02 be viewed as
further confusing the new value exception jurisprudence.
B.

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership
1.

Statutory Interpretation and Dewsnup

Into the breach stepped the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
decision in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass 'n v. 203
03
North LaSalle Street Partnership.1
In a manner similar to Justice
Breyer's opinion, the lower court found justification for the new value
exception in the statutory language.1°4 However, where the Supreme
99. Id.at 448 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)); see
also United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 381 (1988).
Perhaps the strongest argument against the perpetuation of the Case exception
not addressed by the courts is the allowance under Chapter 12, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B), and Chapter 13, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), for the retention of property
by debtors. The inclusion of these statutory exceptions demonstrates Congress's
willingness to preserve junior equity interest over senior unsecured claims where it deems
necessary. Conversely, it strongly suggests that where Congress has not created an
exception, it has done this deliberately.
100. In re Greystone, 995 F.2d at 1284 (the new value exception does not survive the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code). "In withdrawing this portion of the panel opinion
we emphasize that the bankruptcy court's opinion on the 'new value exception' to the
absolute priority rule has been vacated and we express no view whatever on that part of
the bankruptcy court's decision." Id.
101. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
102. See In re Way Apartments, D.T., 201 B.R. 444, 455 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996);
see also In re Batten, 141 B.R. 899 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1992); In re Westwood Plaza
Apartments, 147 B.R. 692 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992); In re Dowden, 143 B.R. 388 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1989).
103. North LaSalle, 524 U.S. at 975.
104. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Court was unwilling to rule in substance upon the existence of the new
value exception, the Seventh Circuit held that it had continued vitality
under the Bankruptcy Code. Under the terms of the new value plan
proposed by the debtors, old equity holders were to contribute $4.1
million of new capital (constituting more than 10% of the total unsecured
debt) in return for the entirety of the equity stake in the new entity.' 0 5 As
such, Judge Ripple and the Seventh Circuit panel were willing to uphold
satisfied the requirements of
the confirmation of a plan that in every way
06
1
Case.
under
developed
test
the prudential
The Supreme Court's decision in North LaSalle addressed the
debtor's argument regarding the statutory origins of the new value
exception as well as the Greystone dissent's concern regarding statutory
construction. With respect to the latter, Judge Jones appeared to be
concerned that the panel's change in position was due to the new rule of
bankruptcy statutory construction enunciated in Dewsnup. 0 7 This,
however, proved to be irrelevant to the new value analysis. Indeed, the
Court's decision in North LaSalle impliedly foreclosed reliance on the
10 8
application of Dewsnup to the question of the new value exception.
Justice Breyer, in discussing the vitality of the new value exception,
seemed to yearn for an explicit disapproval of the new value
105. Id. at 967-68. The opinion contains a detailed recounting of the events leading
up to bankruptcy and the appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
106. See also Bank of America, Illinois v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 195 B.R. 692
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
107. Rule of statutory construction under Dewsnup is that "[w~hen Congress amends
the bankruptcy laws, it does not write 'on a clean slate.' . . . [T]his Court has been
reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular
language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that
is not the subject of at least some discussion on the legislative history." Dewsnup, 502
U.S. at 419 (citing Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515, 521 (1943); United Savings Ass'n of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988) (other
citations omitted); see also Adams, supra note 35, at 1462.
108. This is significant because the Ninth Circuit's holding in Bonner Mall relied, at
least implicitly, on the rule of statutory interpretation advanced in Dewsnup. David R.
Kuney & Timothy R. Epp, Aftermath of Bonner Mall: Evolution or Regression in the
Notion of "New Value"?, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 211, 230-303 (1996). Perhaps this was
due, in part, to the recognition that the absolute priority rule codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) represents a clear and unambiguous reformulation of the doctrine.
Regardless, the failure of the Court to rely upon the Dewsnup rule further supports the
argument that the new value exception in the Bankruptcy Code is fundamentally different
than the one developed under common law.
Justice Thomas's concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, focused its analysis on
the deficiencies of the Dewsnup rule as witnessed by the North LaSalle decision. The
concurrence highlights the inability of the Court to create a generally applicable rule
available to the lower courts in deciding issues of statutory construction. "The
methodological confusion created by Dewsnup has enshrouded both the Courts of
Appeals and, even more tellingly, Bankruptcy Courts, which must interpret the Code on a
daily basis." North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 463 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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exception. 10 9 This, however, is too much to ask: the codification of a
different absolute priority rule foreclosed previous case law on the
matter. Further, for those inclined to follow legislative history, it is clear
that Congress explicitly chose not to adopt the new value
recommendations of the Bankruptcy Commission."0
Whether these
arguments proved beyond the application of the statutory construction
rule of Dewsnup or whether Justice Breyer was not inclined to apply the
rule, the Court chose to focus on the qualifying language of the absolute
priority rule under § 1129.1"'
2.

"On Account Of' and the Test for Causation

For Judge Jones, relying upon the qualifying language of the
statutory absolute priority rule read too much into the statute. However,
for North LaSalle, the very crux of the matter turned on what meaning
the Court would attribute to "on account of." 112 On the one hand, the

Court was unwilling to adopt an understanding of "on account of' that
would be as malleable as that advanced by the debtor.' 13 On the other
hand, the Court seemingly dismissed out of hand the "starchy position"
advanced by the government, namely, that any level of causation would
be sufficient to bar a new value plan from confirmation. Rather, the
proper understanding of "on account of' lay somewhere on the causation
spectrum between the debtor's position and that of the government.
Unfortunately, the Court did not provide a measure for the requisite
degree of causation. What is clear from North LaSalle is that the
confirmation plan offered by the defendants did not satisfy this causation
test. The plan as confirmed gave pre-petition equity the sole opportunity
to contribute new capital to the reorganized entity. 1 4 By any measure of
causation, such a plan clearly violated the statute's "on account of'
language.

109. See supra note 61.
110. See supra note 38.
111. See North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449-50. Indeed, the Court's analysis turns
entirely on which of the three proffered meanings of "on account of" Congress intended
to enact.
112. It is the conclusion of this Article that the ability to contribute new value arises
solely from the language of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The implication of this
approach is that the new value exception is exactly that, an exception to the absolute
priority rule as codified by Congress. "[Tihe holder of any claim or interest that is junior
to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claim or interest any property." 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002). In other
words, by using the words "on account of," the Bankruptcy Code allows a narrow
exception where old equity may participate.
113. North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449-50.
114. Id.at451-52.
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Reconciling the Supreme Court's Decision with the Lower
Courts' Holdings

Underlying the Supreme Court's opinion in North LaSalle is the
standard of review under which the lower courts were overturned. As
mentioned above, the plan as confirmed by the bankruptcy court, and
upheld by the Seventh Circuit, satisfied the prudential new value test.
Old equity's capital contribution represented a substantial inflow of new
capital in the form of money. 1 5 Further, the debtor's stake in the new
to the bankruptcy court, commensurate with
enterprise was, according
16
contribution.'
the capital
The Court's willingness to overturn each of the three lower courts is
difficult to reconcile with the various standards of review. The
bankruptcy court's holding (as well as that of the district and appellate
courts) that the new value exception had continued vitality under the
novo.'17
Bankruptcy Code was a legal determination to be reviewed de
However, once the court made a ruling on the existence of the new value
exception, the remainder of the court's findings was factual. At this
juncture, findings of fact with respect to the satisfaction of the
requirements of new value were to be overturned only where clearly
erroneous. 1 8 Considering the failure of the Supreme Court to even
discuss the factual merits of the confirmed plan, the Supreme Court's
overruling of the lower courts can only be justified upon the de
novo standard of review. 1 9 In other words, the Court's decision stands
in opposition to the prudential new value exception used by the lower
courts. Instead, the Supreme Court appears to have made a finding of
law that rests entirely upon the proposition that the exclusive right of old
equity to participate in the reorganized entity violated the absolute
priority rule. Thus, the Supreme Court enunciated a new legal standard
for old equity's participation: causation.

115. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 1997).
116. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P'ship, 190 B.R. 567, 588 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1995)
(holding, inter alia, that the debtor's plan of reorganization satisfies the Case new value
exception).
117. See In re Way Apartments, D.T., 201 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996);
see also In re Johnston, 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Sunflower Racing, Inc., 226
B.R. 673, 690 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1998).
118. In re Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1998).
119. In re Sea Garden Motel & Apartments, 195 B.R. 294, 300 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996);
see also North LaSalle, 126 F.3d at 962.
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Waiver of Exclusivity

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), debtors have an exclusive period of 120
days to propose and confirm a plan. 20 The difficulty with respect to
North LaSalle is whether this period of exclusivity establishes a property
right that, when exercised by the debtor, creates an exclusive option to
purchase new equity. Supposing that such a situation creates the highest
possible benchmark in the causation test, two possible solutions have
been suggested. The first is that the courts waive the period of
exclusivity to allow parties in interest to offer competing plans of
reorganization 121 However, the courts should be chary to overrule the
dominant position in reorganization contemplated by the exclusivity
period. 22 The court may also, upon a showing of cause, reduce the
period of exclusivity. 23 Thus there exists the legal basis for a court
concerned about the issue of causation to allow for the proposal of other
24
plans of reorganization.1
120. On motion by the debtor, the exclusivity period can be extended to 180 days. 11
U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2002). This period can be extended further upon a showing of cause.
Id. § 1121(d); see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV.
729, 753 (34 out of 40 Chapter 11 cases studied allowed exclusivity to be extended
throughout the entire confirmation process).
121. See, e.g., In re Situation Management Systems, Inc., 252 B.R. 859 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2000); In re SM 104, Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 225 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). Contrast
this with In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Even assuming that an
exclusive opportunity is 'property,' it does not follow that such an opportunity is property
received or retained 'on account of old equity's prior ownership interests in the
debtor.").
It should be observed, a priori, that such a position is fraught with logical
inconsistencies. Suppose that old equity represents the only willing participants in a
reorganization, such that their contribution is "necessary." While this satisfies the
"necessary" prong of the prudential new value test, it would run squarely into this broad
definition of causation. Thus, if it is accepted that the Bankruptcy Code allows for the
participation of old equity in certain circumstances, it would be defeatist to hold the
standard so high.
122. The measure of causation that is impermissible is where old equity was allowed
to retain an interest in the reorganized entity "because of' their previous equity holdings.
Consideration of causation should be a factual determination proven by the proponent of
a plan by a preponderance of the evidence.
Further, the two-part test proposed in this Article addresses the concerns of those
courts that would rather err on the side of caution. Even if a plan of reorganization is
confirmed under the period of exclusivity with old equity as the only contributors of new
equity, the plan would still face the rigors of the prudential new value test.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
124. Though it appears to happen quite rarely, parties in interest who propose a plan
of reorganization may also rely upon the cram-down mechanism of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
See, e.g., In re Consul Restaurant Corp., 146 B.R. 979 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). If two or
more parties propose to cram-down a plan, the purpose of the waiver of exclusivity has
been defeated. The major, discernible difference between the two plans would be the
participation of old equity. However, the purpose of allowing alternative plans was to
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c.

Auction of Reorganized Entity

The other procedure often suggested to avoid the issue of causation
due to the exclusivity period is to have an auction of the reorganized
entity.'2 5 Unlike the waiver of the exclusivity period, there is no
statutory justification for such a procedure.1 26 Further, there is no basis
for inferring that a bankruptcy court has the capabilities to undertake
such a procedure. Indeed, this requirement would go beyond the powers
of the bankruptcy court and supercede the statutory structure in which a
plan is confirmed.' 27 Thus, as a matter of application for courts
concerned with plans implicating the absolute priority rule, and where
the
market valuation represents a serious dispute between the parties,
28
best approach may be to use a waiver of the period of exclusivity.1
C. PrudentialNew Value Exception
The question, therefore, is whether this threshold causation test is
independent of the common law elements of the new value exception, or
avoid implicating the absolute priority rule.
125. See, e.g., In re Ropt Ltd. P'ship, 152 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (auction
used to determine whether the contribution of old equity was commensurate with the
interest it sought in the reorganized enterprise); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R.
1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (bidding rights were extended only to the debtors and
creditors, creating, in reality, a situation very similar to the waiver of the period of
exclusivity). These appear to be the only reported cases using an auction as an
instrument of a new value plan. Neither of these cases, however, used auctions to detach
old equity from gaining possession of the reorganized entity "on account of' its prior
holdings; rather, the auctions were intended to measure the adequacy of the contribution.
126. This is not to say that the Court did not consider the creation of an auction
mechanism as a requirement for cram-down plans that implicate the absolute priority
rule. The Court refused the invitation of the Petitioner and its various supporters to create
the common law requirement of auctioning the reorganized entity.
127. Requiring an auction would create another interesting paradox between the
concern for causation and the prudential new value test. Suppose that the bankruptcy
court should conduct an auction in which old equity was the only bidder. Depending on
where the bidding started, old equity could conceivably retain an interest in the
reorganized entity at a price far below its willingness to pay. However, such an outcome
would run afoul of the prudential test's requirement that the contribution be substantial
and commensurate with interest obtained. By satisfying the concern for causation, old
equity has implicated other concerns of fairness. This contradiction highlights the policy
differences between causation and contribution: the former seeks to determine whether
old equity's participation was "on account of' its prior equity interests, while the latter
seeks to reassure the courts that the bankruptcy laws are not being used as a means of
avoiding liabilities. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
128. The purpose of instituting an auction under North LaSalle is different than the
use of an auction to determine reasonable equivalence. The former seeks simply to sever
the binds of causation while the latter seeks to ensure that old equity does not receive a
"bargain." Neither of these goals are certain to be achieved via an auction, and actually,
both could be undermined.
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merely incorporated through its many parts. Unfortunately, the Court
was unwilling to give the lower courts sufficient guidance in the
matter. 129 However, the implications of North LaSalle along with the
history of the Bankruptcy Code do much to disparage the former
position. When Congress adopted the absolute priority rule, it did so in a
manner fundamentally different from the previous rule. 130 Further, the
new value exception, as derived from the statutory language, lacks the
foundations upon which the previous exception was built. To say that
Congress intended to adopt such a complicated or convoluted exception
without explicitly doing so would stretch the statute too far. However,
the courts must give effect to the entirety of the statute and this includes
the qualifying language of "on account of" 3 1-- ergo, the causation
approach advocated in North LaSalle.
The development of the five-part test of the new value exception
also indicates a separate existence. Through dicta, the Supreme Court's
decision in North LaSalle clearly indicates that the Bankruptcy Code
requires a level of causation that prohibits new value plans from
confirmation. The requisite level of causation, however, has nothing to
do with the form in which new value may be contributed. For example,
in its previous new value case, the Supreme Court held that certain forms
of in-kind contributions are not permissible. The specific form of the
contribution has very little to do with whether participation
in the
32
reorganized entity was caused by one's status as old equity.'
This does not mean that the five-part test of the new value exception
has perished. Indeed, it serves to assuage the concerns of those who
believe a new value exception based upon "on account of' would
undermine the congressionally imposed minimum for fair and equitable.
129. "Which of these positions is ultimately entitled to prevail is not to be decided
here .. " Bank of America Nat'l Trust Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
454 (1999).
130. Id. at 450.
131. Many lower courts interpreted the Court's earlier decision in Ahlers as a
rejection of the new value exception. While there is little doubt that Justice Breyer's
discussion of the government's position is dictum, it is clear that the Court has rejected
such a position. In other words, while the Court is reticent on whether it does exist, it
seems to have answered its "duality" question in the negative, i.e., whether it does not
exist. The implication is clear: the new value exception exists in some form.
132. This conclusion is not limited to the requirement of the contribution being of
"money or money's worth." That the contribution must be "new" and "necessary" also
goes beyond a simple causation barrier. On the former, for example, old equity may also
be a creditor who wishes to convert past debt into new equity. The contribution is clearly
not "new" in the sense that it is an immediate cash infusion. Similarly, on the
requirement of "necessary," there is no reason, other than equitable or prudential, that old
equity be excluded simply because the reorganized enterprise suddenly becomes an
attractive investment. The only possible exception to this conclusion is the requirement
that the equity stake be commensurate with the new contribution.

2004]

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

The Court has made clear that "on account of' requires a threshold level
of causation. Further, the Court has said that such causation is
implicated where old equity is allowed to participate exclusively or has
an option to do so. Thus, the minimum protections of fairness and equity
the
are apparently satisfied when old equity's participation in
33
holdings.
previous
Court's
the
by
caused
not
is
reorganized entity
It must also be noted that, even without the five-part test, the level
of protection afforded to dissenting creditors in a cram down is
substantial. First, the "best interest of the creditors" test ensures that no
plan is confirmable without it being at least as good as a Chapter 7
liquidation. 134 Therefore, a dissenting unsecured creditor receives
superior treatment under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 135 Second
is the absolute priority rule, which can be seen as ensuring that under the
most preferential regime the dissenting unsecured creditors are receiving
the most money possible. 36 The new value exception, therefore,
recognizes the potential gains from including old equity while placing
high barriers to ensure that the system is not abused. Thus, the
prudential exception is based upon a premise of suspicion, i.e., that the
courts look unfavorably upon these plans lest they allow the Bankruptcy
Code to be a source of abuse harkening back to the original justification
of the absolute priority rule.
These protections, superiority over Chapter 7, the absolute priority
rule, and the causation threshold test, represent a substantial minimum
requirement for any plan to overcome. Accepting that Congress intended
133. Another interesting argument is that the language of I1 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) bars old equity's participation based upon previous holdings in the
bankruptcy estate. Subscribing to a reading as narrow as Judge Jones's dissent would not
allow old equity's participation based upon its status as old equity. See supra Part
III.A.3. In other words, the Bankruptcy Code makes a distinction between status and
participation that ought not to be obfuscated in the hasty desire to reconcile past practices
with modem statutes.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2002). Professors Carlson and Williams describe this
rule as ensuring a Pareto superior allocation between Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter
11 reorganizations. See David G. Carlson & Jack F. Williams, The Truth About the New
Value Exception to Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1303

(2000).
135. The Supreme Court has rejected the view that a bankrupt business has no "going
concern" value. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207-09 (1988). It
seems that implementation of this conclusion within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code
is problematic. If a firm liquidates under Chapter 7, it presumably does not have any
"going concern" value. However, if a firm is reorganized under Chapter 11, this is done
on the assumption that there is some underlying value in keeping the business going. A
major justification thus exists for the five-part new value test: the courts can be assured
that the new value captures the entirety of the reorganized entity's going concern instead
of leaving it in the hands of those who have come to the court seeking to avoid debtors.
See generally id.
136. 11 U.S.C. § I129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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to allow the participation of old equity in the new entity, the five-part
new value exception test actually increases the requirements for the
confirmation of a plan.137 At this juncture, the better argument would be
whether it is prudent for the courts to continue using such a rigorous test
in the face of already difficult hurdles. Regardless of the answer, it is
clear that the new value exception has new vitality under the absolute
priority rule though its form has been substantially changed.
IV. Conclusion
The common law rule of absolute priority, in its most extreme,
served to bar equity holders in a bankrupt enterprise from owning any
interest in the reorganized entity. The harshness of this rule was
mitigated by the new value exception, which allowed the participation of
old equity holders where their contribution satisfied requirements
developed through case law. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
represents a marked departure from the superceded bankruptcy regime in
that the absolute priority rule is now codified. Congress apparently
failed to do the same for the new value exception. As a result, a great
deal of uncertainty has entered into certain Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to fully
resolve this issue. This Article argued that the new value exception
exists in the qualifying language of the Chapter 11 absolute priority rule.
Further, this Article argued that the proper test is that hinted at by the
Supreme Court, namely, a causation test.
Finally, this Article
demonstrated that the five-part test historically attributed to the new
value exception ought to have continued viability. In other words, the
five-part test is only invoked once the debtor has satisfied the threshold
concern of causation under the absolute priority rule. While the
protections afforded dissenting creditors under the Bankruptcy Code are
substantial, the five-part test reflects the judiciary's continued concern
regarding abuse of the bankruptcy laws.

137. The seeming complexity of the new value exception exists so that the courts can
be assured that the new value captures the entirety of the reorganized entity's going
concern instead of leaving it in the hands of those who have come to the court seeking a
reorganization. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 197.

